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Prior literature has claimed that accounting plays a negative role in a financial crisis. The 
current study sought to determine whether this effect is dependent on the quality of 
financial reporting. Specifically, this study examined the impact of the quality of financial 
reporting (as measured via earnings quality) on liquidity (measured by the bid-ask spread) 
in the equity market during the 2008–2009 global financial crisis in the United Kingdom. 
We found, as expected, that market liquidity was much lower during the crisis than prior to 
the crisis; however, firms with high-quality financial reporting suffered fewer negative 
effects as a result of the financial crisis. The results were robust after controlling for other 
influences, such as return volatility, loss making, market value of equity, and other potential 
endogeneity problems. In addition, adopting alternative models for earnings quality did not 
alter our inferences. Our results support the notion that high-quality accounting information 
can reduce information asymmetry and hence enhance investor confidence during a 
financial crisis. The results suggest that a stable financial reporting system is an important 
part of that overall economic fabric. Our findings will help build a framework on which an 
overall financial crisis risk-management strategy can be developed to avoid future crises. 
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I. Introduction and Research Motivation  
The global financial crisis that began in 2008 significantly shook investor confidence 
worldwide and raised serious concerns about the stability of the financial system. The crisis 
originated in the collapse of the subprime mortgage market in the United States and 
subsequently evolved into a much more dangerous phenomenon, causing many corporate 
casualties in the United States and Europe. The literature concerning the causes of the crisis 
has attempted to clarify the role played by accounting; more specifically, there has been 
heated debate regarding whether fair-value measurement substantially accelerated the 
market meltdown. Critics have alleged that fair values are less transparent and increase 
information asymmetry—that after fair-value accounting was performed to recognize many 
unrealized losses for financial assets and liabilities in an attempt to avoid a vicious cycle of 
falling prices, fair-value accounting in fact triggered this cycle, or at least amplified and 
exacerbated its severity (see Liao et al., 2010, Liao et al., 2013; Liao et al 2014). However, 
Madras Gartenberg and Serafeim (2009) found inconsistencies in this idea, showing that 
fair valuation depressed equity values during the financial crisis. Laux and Leuz (2010) 
found little evidence that downward spirals or asset “fire sales” in certain markets were the 
result of fair-value accounting. Barth and Landsman (2010) concluded that fair-value 
accounting played little or no role in the 2008 recession. 
 
The debate highlights the importance of accounting in the stability of economic systems 
and in maintaining investor confidence, both of which were notably absent during the crisis. 
The nature of the debate motivated us to consider more generally the role of financial 
reporting in the crisis. Fair valuation is only one part of financial reporting. Moreover, fair 
valuation is not likely to be a serious issue for non-financial institutions (Madras 
Gartenberg & Serafeim, 2009). Therefore, in the current paper, we decided to focus our 
attention on the quality of financial reporting as a whole to determine its effect on the 
quality of information. We argue that high-quality financial reporting will provide timely, 
relevant, and transparent information that could help minimize uncertainty. Conversely, we 
argue that low-quality financial reporting is associated with ambiguous, misleading, or 
unreliable information, which is likely to increase information asymmetry and market 
illiquidity. Because market participants are likely to face great uncertainty and risk, they 
may pay closer attention to the credibility of information in making a decision during a 
financial crisis. Hence, we would expect to see a positive relationship between the quality 
of financial reporting and liquidity of the equity market. In our context, this would mean 
that firms with higher-quality financial reporting would have been less adversely affected 
by the 2008 meltdown, all other factors being equal. 
 
Our research design relied on prior studies (Barth et al., 2008; Jones et al., 2008; H. Chen 
et al., 2010), and we used earnings quality as a valid proxy for financial reporting quality 
(Leuz et al., 2003; Biddle et al., 2009; F. Chen et al., 2010). Our proxy for information 
asymmetry was the bid-ask spread, which is also frequently used in this line of study 
(Mohd, 2005; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; Bhat & Jayaraman, 2009). We chose the United 




hit most severely by the global economic recession. 
 
The findings were generally consistent with our predictions. We found that the bid-ask 
spread widened during the financial crisis, suggesting that liquidity of the share market 
decreased. However, we also found evidence that liquidity increased with financial 
reporting quality during the period of financial distress. That is, firms with higher-quality 
financial reporting suffered a relatively less significant negative effect of the crisis on their 
liquidity. Financial reporting played a mitigating role, not only for large firms but for small 
and medium-sized firms as well. Finally, we particularly concerned ourselves with whether 
our prediction would hold for financial firms, because they were the most seriously 
impacted. Our results offer unambiguous evidence that a transparent accounting system can 
also help financial institutions to be more stable during an economic downturn. Our 
findings regarding the relationship between financial reporting quality and bid-ask spread 
were robust when we controlled for endogeneity and other confounding factors. 
 
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, our evidence corroborates the 
findings from a glowing body of research on the relationship between accounting and 
auditing and the global financial crisis (e.g., Liao et al 2010, 2013, 2014; Aldamen et al, 
2012). Second, there is limited evidence regarding the overall financial reporting system on 
the crisis. Our research fills this gap by exploring and explicitly showing the links between 
information asymmetry and the quality of financial reporting. Third, the vast majority of 
extant studies in this area focus on U.S. firms, whereas there is a lack of analysis of the 
European experience on the association between accounting and the financial crisis. 
Because the institutional and economic factors are likely to be different between the two 
regions, the associative pattern is likely to differ as well. Therefore, our study should 
expand our knowledge on this issue. Fourth, Lang and Maffett (2011) found that firms in a 
global sample with greater transparency experienced less liquidity volatility and fewer 
extreme illiquidity events during the financial crisis. However, there is a concern that, since 
their study was conducted in an international setting, the observed differences in liquidity at 
the firm level may not have been caused by differences in accounting quality; instead, they 
might have been a result of institutional differences on the national level. To address this 
issue, we chose a national setting for our study, which has the following advantages: (1) 
firms in our sample used the same accounting standards; (2) this approach reduced the 
difficulty in controlling for many national institutional differences that potentially affect 
financial reporting characteristics, such as legal protection for investors, disclosure 
requirements, and ownership concentration; and (3) it is well documented that different 
countries experienced very different impacts of the financial crisis on their stock market, 
which could not be easily resolved in an international setting. Thus, we believe our results 
will complement evidence reported by earlier studies. 
 
In sum, our robust empirical results suggest that a sound financial reporting system 
mitigates investor concerns about information uncertainty and increases investor 
confidence, improving market liquidity, and thus will play a positive role in a financial 




an important part of our overall economic fabric. In this sense, our project provides new 
data for the international accounting literature, and important policy implications should 
follow to improve regulatory arrangements with respect to financial reporting quality, such 
as reducing ambiguous accounting methods and enhancing auditor independence, to 
mention two examples. Our findings will help build a framework for capital market 
regulators and other government agencies, on the basis of which a financial crisis risk 
management strategy—whether national or international—including accounting and 
corporate governance, can be developed with the hope that future liquidity crises of a 
similar nature could be avoided. 
 
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Section II provides a literature review and 
develops our hypothesis. Section III discusses the research methodology. Section IV 
presents the results. Section V concludes the article.  
 
II. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Information asymmetry, investor decision-making, and market liquidity 
The association between financial information and information asymmetry is a key issue in 
understanding the role of accounting in the financial crisis. Previous studies have shown that 
information asymmetry arises as a result of separation of ownership and control, and 
managers of a company may have private inside information that is not available to outside 
investors. However, managers are not allowed to trade their company’s shares on inside 
information, so their knowledge should not directly affect liquidity. On the other hand, 
outside investors are not equally informed. Some investors, such as institutional shareholders 
who have a close relationship with managers, may have access to or share some private 
information with the managers, meaning that they might have a comparative advantage in 
processing the accuracy of accounting estimates. These investors are informed investors. In 
contrast, uninformed investors have difficulty in evaluating the quality of and risks associated 
with the reported assets and liabilities of a given firm. This information asymmetry leads to an 
adverse selection problem, in which informed investors exploit their informational advantage 
at the expense of uninformed investors (Glosten & Milgrom, 1985). Consequently, market 
participants facing an adverse selection problem will seek price protection to increase the 
bid-ask spread as a means of protecting themselves against expected losses from trading with 
more informed investors. This argument suggests that information asymmetry increases the 
bid-ask spread, thereby reducing market liquidity. 
 
Determinants of financial reporting quality 
There is a general consensus that the purpose of financial reporting, particularly earnings 
information, is to narrow information asymmetry and market uncertainty for external users 
and investors. However, the quality of financial reporting is not constant. Extant literature 
shows that the quality of financial reporting depends on the following country-level factors: 
the underlying legal system (La Porta et al., 1998); whether the economy is market-oriented 
or bank-oriented (Durnev & Kim, 2005); the accounting standards adopted (Barth et al., 
2008; Tang et al., 2010); and the level of law enforcement (Hope, 2003). At the firm level, 




auditor type, overseas listings, recent increases in capital or debt, and complexity (Morris 
& Gray, 2007).  
 
It is also widely accepted that management has incentives to manage earnings, which would 
result in higher earnings opacity and increase information risk. Such incentives include 
improving market performance, boosting share price, increasing analyst following, and 
others (Barth et al., 1999; Schrand & Walther, 2000). If the market price is expected to 
react to unexpected earnings (Ball & Brown, 1968) and rational managers believe that 
investors are unable to detect opportunistic behaviour (Bernard & Thomas, 1990, 1989; 
Abarbanell & Bernard, 1992; Ball & Bartov, 1996; Sloan, 1996), then managers will take 
advantage of the inherent subjectivity in accounting assumptions and standards to achieve 
personal benefit by engaging in earnings management (Ahmed et al., 1999; Holthausen & 
Verrecchia, 1990; Healy & Palepu, 1993). Apart from capital market considerations, there 
may be direct economic consequences of earnings measures, for example, regulatory and 
political costs, debt covenants, and CEO compensation (Aboody & Kasznik, 2000; Aboody 
et al., 2004; Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). Dechow et al (2010) concluded that management 
discretion, distortions of disclosure, estimation errors, and manipulation of the size of 
reported gains or losses all reduce the quality of financial reporting.  
 
In addition, previous literature has emphasized that earnings management often focuses on 
the discretionary (rather than the usual) component of accruals. Discretionary accruals are 
subject to arbitrary interpretation of flexible accounting standards by self-interested 
managers and consequently are believed to be obscure and biased about the underlying 
income and financial position of a firm (e.g., Chen et al., 2010). Since discretionary inputs 
are less precise and involve more risk, information asymmetry between informed and 
uninformed investors would be more severe with earnings assessed on the basis of 
discretionary accruals.  
 
Market perception of accounting information quality 
Prior literature has shown that high-quality financial disclosure and earnings figures reduce 
information asymmetry and increase investor confidence (Francis et al., 2004, 2005; Lambert 
et al., 2007) and has documented a positive association between the quality of accounting 
information and capital market performance (Kim & Verrecchia, 1994; Lang and Maffett, 
2011). For example, Welker (1995) found that analysts’ ratings of firms’ disclosures are 
significantly and negatively associated with the bid-ask spread. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) 
showed that firms committing themselves to the International Accounting Standards or the 
U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (a proxy for increased levels of disclosure) 
experienced a lower bid-ask spread than firms that used the German Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles. Brown and Hillegeist (2007) also documented an inverse relationship 
between the spread-based measure of information asymmetry and disclosure quality, which 
reduces the likelihood that informed traders will discover and trade on private information. 
Other studies that examined the cost of capital found that disclosure not only reduced the 




et al., 2007). Consistent with this argument, Francis et al. (2004, 2005) found that the cost of 
capital is negatively correlated with seven earnings attributes, especially accrual quality. 
 
In sum, higher-quality financial reporting should allow investors to make more informed 
business decisions and should restrict opportunities for insiders to expropriate the wealth of 
outside investors and creditors. The empirical evidence suggests that information asymmetry 
is an inverse function of financial reporting quality. These studies also imply that there is a 
link between information quality and liquidity. Systematic risk is a covariation/sensitivity 
effect. A firm with higher systematic risk will perform relatively worse (better) during bad 
(good) macroeconomic conditions (Campbell et al., 1997). Market liquidity reflects the 
ability to trade large quantities of shares quickly, at a low cost, and without moving the price 
(Pastor & Stambaugh, 2003). A decline in liquidity is typically associated with an economic 
status in which there is investor outflow from the equity markets amidst high market 
volatility and risk aversion (e.g., Chordia et al., 2000; Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2009). In 
addition, because of investors’ aversion to risk, the demand for shares of firms with 
higher-quality information is subject to less fluctuation conditional on market liquidity. 
Decreased liquidity will affect the investor behaviour of different firms differently. Investors 
in companies associated with a high degree of uncertainty and adverse selection problems 
because of poor information quality are more likely to leave the market. In addition, market 
makers are less likely to provide liquidity because of concerns about adverse selection, 
resulting in a further reduction in investor demand for these shares. Thus, these firms perform 
worse when liquidity decreases. Conversely, when liquidity increases, there is an inflow of 
investors and market makers, which increases the demand and liquidity of the shares of the 
firms associated with greater uncertainty and adverse selection. Thus, the returns of firms 
with lower information quality (i.e., higher information risk) are more sensitive to changes in 
market liquidity. That is, information quality contributes to liquidity risk (Ng, 2011). 
 
Moreover, from the signalling theory perspective (Spence, 1973, 2002), it can be argued 
that higher-quality accounting information provides a more accurate indication of 
underlying performance, and firms with higher operating performance are expected to have 
more incentives to provide earnings information of higher quality to show the true status of 
the firm and thereby avoid adverse selection. Consequently, this should narrow information 
asymmetry and reduce information risk and illiquidity, particularly during a period of 
financial distress. In contrast, poor performing firms do not want to make their financial 
results transparent, making it more difficult for investors to understand the true situation. In 
addition, previous studies suggest that business transaction costs include the cost to search, 
collect, and interpret relevant information (Williamson, 1981). Thus, a higher-quality 
earnings figure can help provide market participants with reliable information, so that the 
buyer and seller of shares of the firm can relatively easily reach an agreement about the 








Financial reporting quality and market liquidity during the crisis 
We assert that high-quality financial reporting is even more important for investors during 
times of financial distress. Financial crises often occur suddenly, seriously disrupting 
capital markets (Mishkin, 1992) and resulting in substantial share price volatility and asset 
value meltdowns. In the context of a financial crisis, market uncertainty is greater than in a 
normal business environment and investor confidence is often significantly reduced, which 
consequently leads to increased demands for reliable information. On the other hand, 
management’s incentives for wealth expropriation become stronger, because tough times 
make some insiders act more unethically, perhaps as a survival tactic (Johnson et al., 2000). 
As a result, earnings management would be more likely to be used to hide expropriation or 
poor performance caused by depressed economic conditions. Outside investors, therefore, 
become more sensitive than previously to firms’ integrity regarding financial disclosures 
(Rajan and Zingales, 1998), and they are inevitably more aggressive in seeking price 
protection. Accordingly, the current global financial crisis provides a unique setting to 
empirically test the link between financial reporting quality and information asymmetry as 
measured by lower market illiquidity, or bid-ask spread. Based on the above arguments, we 
propose the following testable hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: Higher-quality financial reporting mitigates the negative effect of a 
financial crisis on market liquidity, as measured by the bid-ask spread. 
 
III. Research Design 
a. Empirical Model 
According to the literature (e.g., Leuz et al., 2000; Christensen et al., 2011), we used the 
following model to determine the impact of a crisis on bid-ask spread (see Table 1):  
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We used the log value of the bid-ask spread, measured as the yearly median and mean 
quoted spread, as the dependent variable that increases (decreases) illiquidity (liquidity).5 
Crisis is an indicator variable that equals 1 for observations during the crisis period 
(2008–2009) and 0 for the non-crisis period (2005–2007). AQ is a financial reporting 
quality proxy (see next section for details of calculation of AQ). The interaction term, 
Crisis*AQ, captures the effect of financial reporting on market liquidity. If high-quality 
reporting mitigates the impact of the crisis, the coefficient is expected to be negative. 
We used one market microstructure measure, the bid-ask spread, to measure information 
asymmetry. The bid-ask spread is a well-developed and often employed proxy in the 
accounting and finance literature (Krinsky & Lee, 1996; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; Roger, 
2008; Bhat & Jayaraman, 2009; Ball et al., 2012). Muller et al. (2011, p. 1144) suggested 
that the bid-ask spread has good theoretical underpinnings and that the component 
attributable to information asymmetry can be isolated. When information asymmetry 
among equity investors is high, informed investors can exploit the information advantage at 
the expense of uninformed investors. Uninformed investors realize that they are faced with 
                                                              
5 Our model implies that annual earnings information is associated with investors’ daily trading activities 




an adverse selection problem and therefore seek to increase the bid-ask spread to protect 
themselves against expected losses from trading with more informed investors (Venkatesh 
& Chiang, 1986; Chae, 2005). In particular, the bid-ask spread is a better measure of 
information asymmetry among market participants that is especially useful as a dependent 
variable in a setting characterized by rapidly changing levels of market uncertainty, i.e., 
during financial crises (Liao et al., 2010, 2014). 
 
We considered the following control variables with reference to prior literature. We 
included turnover to control for market makers’ inventory holding costs and risk, and a 
negative coefficient is predicted (Muller et al., 2011). Turnover is the log value of yearly 
share median turnover (daily US$ trading volume divided by the market value at the end of 
each trading day). Size is the log value of equity, calculated as the stock price times the 
number of shares outstanding (in US$ million) at the end of the year. We controlled for 
firm size because large firms are likely to be scrutinised more closely and thus could be 
more transparent, such that bigger firms are expected to have lower market risk than 
smaller firms (Ng, 2011). Volatility is the log value of return volatility, which is the 
standard deviation of daily stock returns for the year.  
 
b. Financial Reporting Quality Proxies 
AQ serves as a proxy for financial reporting quality, which equals the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals multiplied by −1. Discretionary accruals equal total accruals minus 
estimated normal accruals, and we used the following five widely adopted models to 
estimate discretionary accruals.6 Note that AQ is actually a measure of earnings quality 
that decreases earnings management and thus increases financial reporting quality.  
 
Decow et al. (2010) defined earnings quality as follows: Higher-quality earnings provide 
more information about the features of a firm’s financial performance that are relevant to a 
specific decision made by a specific decision maker. They organized the earnings quality 
proxies into three broad categories—properties of earnings, investor responsiveness to 
earnings, and external indicators of earnings misstatements—and emphasized that they 
reached no conclusion about the single best measure of earnings quality. Researchers 
typically use the earnings response coefficient as a proxy for investor responsiveness; this 
measure is not suitable for our study, as the bid-ask spread also gauges investor 
responsiveness. External indicators, such as earnings restatements, are available for a 
limited number of firms. Therefore, it appears that the properties of earnings are the most 
appropriate proxy for earnings quality in our context. Properties of earnings include 
earnings persistence and accruals, earnings smoothness, asymmetric timeliness and timely 
loss recognition, and target beating. These proxies are used for earnings management, 
which is assumed to erode earnings quality. Accruals and abnormal accruals have the 
following features. In its favour, measurement of accruals attempts to isolate the managed 
or error component of accruals, and the use of these models has become the accepted 
                                                              





methodology in accounting to capture discretion. However, tests of the 
determinants/consequences of earnings management are joint tests of the theory and the 
abnormal accrual metric as a proxy for earnings management. Correlated omitted variables 
associated with fundamentals, especially performance, are of concern, given the 
dependence of normal accruals on fundamentals and the endogeneity of the hypothesized 
determinants/consequences with the fundamentals (Decow et al., 2010). Despite these 
limitations, it appears that they influence other measures and are more suitable for our 
project. For instance, it is still not clear whether earnings smoothing would increase or 
decrease earnings quality. Because we have already considered the effect of loss as firm, 
timely loss recognition is unlikely to increase our test power.  
 
We next discuss the specific models used in our study to measure earnings quality.  
(1) Jones Model 
Jones (1991) argued that normal accruals are determined by two fundamentals: change of 
revenue and fixed assets investment. Accruals not explained by fundamentals are 
discretionary and will add bias into earnings, which lowers the quality of earnings as a 
measure to reflect performance of the firm. Thus, the basic model (Jones, 1991; DeFond & 
Jiambalvo, 1994) is:  
 
1 -1 2 3(1 )it it it it itTA Assets REV PPE         
 
TA is total accruals scaled by lagged total assets for firm i in year t, in which total accruals 
are calculated as the difference between income before extraordinary items and operating 
cash flows. Assets are the year-end assets for company i in year t-1. ΔREV is the change in 
sales from year t-1 to year t. PPE is gross property, plant, and equipment. TA, ΔREV, and 
PPE are scaled by Assets. 
We estimated coefficients of the model from cross-sectional industry regressions by 
two-digit SIC groups for the year. We required a minimum of 10 observations for each 
two-digit SIC group for the year. The discretionary accrual is the predicted residual of the 
model. We then multiplied –1 by the absolute value of the residual and referred to it as 
AQ_JM. The higher the AQ_JM, the higher the earnings quality/financial reporting quality. 
 
(2) Modified Jones Model 
The Jones model assumes that all credit sales are non-discretionary; however, Dechow et al. 
(1995) argued that change of accounting receivables is discretionary and should be 
deducted from change of sales to estimate normal accruals. Therefore, the modified Jones 
model (Dechow et al., 1995; DeFond & Subramanyam, 1998) is: 
 
1 -1 2 3(1 ) ( )it it it it it itTA Assets REV AR PPE          
 
ΔAR is the change in accounts receivable from year t-1 to year t, deflated by total assets of 
year t-1. The definitions of other variables in the model are the same as for the Jones model. 




predicted residuals of the model, multiplied by –1. The higher the AQ_MJM, the higher the 
quality of financial reporting. 
 
(3) Adapted Jones Model 
Dechow et al. (2003) contended that the modified Jones model assumes that all credit 
revenues are discretionary and thus induces a positive correlation between discretionary 
accruals and current sales growth. They proposed the following adapted Jones model, 
which includes only the unexpected portion of the change in accounts receivables: 
1 -1 2 3(1 ) ((1 ) )it it it it it itTA Assets k REV AR PPE            
The coefficient k is estimated in each two-digit SIC group for the year by the following 
model, which captures the expected change in accounts receivable for a given change in 
sales: 
 
it it itAR k REV       
 
The definitions of the variables in the two models are the same as in the modified Jones 
model. Then, similarly, the discretionary accrual (AQ_AJM) is the absolute value of the 
predicted residual of the model multiplied by –1.  
 
(4) Modified Jones Model with Book-to-Market Ratio and Cash Flow from 
Operations 
Larcker and Richardson (2004) argued that the discretionary accruals estimated using the 
modified Jones model are correlated with growth in operating performance and contain 
measurement errors. Hence, they added the book-to-market ratio and cash flow from 
operations to the modified Jones model: 
1 -1 2 3 4 5(1 ) ( )it it it it it it it itTA Assets REV AR PPE BM CFO              
where BM is the book-to-market value of the common equity and CFO is the cash flow 
from operations in year t scaled by total assets in t-1. The definitions of other variables are 
the same as modified Jones model, and again, the discretionary accrual (AQ_MBCFO) is 
the absolute value of the predicted residual of the model multiplied by –1. 
  
(5) Modified Jones Model with Last-Year ROA 
To control for measurement errors in discretionary accruals caused by performance, 
Kothari et al. (2005) added ROA to the modified Jones model (see following for definition 
of ROA). The performance-matched Jones model (PJM) has since become a standard 
model to estimate normal accruals: 
1 -1 2 3 4 1(1 ) ( )it it it it it it itTA Assets REV AR PPE ROA            
 
ROA is income before extraordinary items for firm i in year t-1 over total assets in year t-2, 
and the discretionary accrual (AQ_PJM) is the absolute value of the predicted residual of 






Table 1 Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Liquidity   
Log(spread) Log value of the yearly median quoted spread (defined as the difference 
between the bid price and ask price divided by the mid-point and measured at 
the end of each trading day). 
Log(spread1) Log value of the yearly mean quoted spread. 
AQ (financial reporting quality) 
AQ_JM The product of –1 and absolute value of discretionary accruals. Discretionary 
accruals are estimated using the cross-sectional Jones model, the 
cross-sectional modified Jones model, the cross-sectional adapted Jones 
model, the cross-sectional modified Jones model with book-to-market ratio 
and cash flow from operations, and the cross-sectional modified Jones model 
with the last-year ROA, respectively. We require a minimum of 10 
observations for each two-digit SIC group for the year. 
AQ_MJM The product of –1 and absolute value of discretionary accruals. Discretionary 
accruals are estimated using cross-sectional modified Jones model. 
AQ_AJM The product of –1 and absolute value of discretionary accruals. Discretionary 
accruals are estimated using cross-sectional adapted Jones model. 
AQ_MBCFO The product of –1 and absolute value of discretionary accruals. Discretionary 
accruals are estimated using the cross-sectional modified Jones model with 
book-to-market ratio and cash flow from operations. 
AQ_PJM The product of –1 and absolute value of discretionary accruals. Discretionary 
accruals are estimated using the cross-sectional modified Jones model with 
the last-year ROA. 
Crisis  Indicator variable equals 1 for observations in the crisis period (2008–2009) 
and 0 for observations in the non-crisis period (2005–2007). 
Turnover Log(share turnover). Share turnover is defined as daily US$ trading volume 
divided by the market value at the end of each trading day. 
Size Log(market value). Market value is defined as stock price times the number 
of shares outstanding (in US$ million). 
Volatility Log(return volatility). Return volatility is defined as the standard deviation of 
daily stock returns in a given year. 
Loss Indicator variable; equals one if net income is negative in a given year and 
zero otherwise. 
PRICE The ending trading price in a given year. 
Industry FE Industry fixed effects. There are 30 SIC2 industries in our sample. We 
generated 29 industry dummy variables. 
 
c. Sample Selection, Descriptive Statistics, and Correlation Coefficients 
Sample Selection 
Bid-ask spread data, price-related data, and financial data were obtained from the 




Union and its member states formally adopted International Financial Reporting Standards 
IFRS for the preparation of financial statements on 1 January 2005. To prevent the shift in 
accounting standards from affecting determinations of earnings quality, we started 
sampling at 2005. We ended sampling in 2009 because most serious events of the current 
crisis took place in 2008 and 2009.  
 
We started the selection process for the sample firms from all listed firms. In calculating 
discretionary accruals, we then excluded firms that did not have the required data and 
industries that had fewer than 10 firms. In line with previous analyses (Hail, 2011; 
Christensen et al., 2011), we excluded firms with a market value of equity of less than 1 
million US dollars. The final sample was distributed across 30 industries and included 4271 
firm-year observations. The numbers of observations for 2005 to 2009 are 624, 745, 877, 
987, and 1038, respectively. 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients 
Table 2 (below) provides descriptive statistics of our sample firms. Panel A provides 
statistics for the whole sample, while Panel B divides it into two subsamples, a pre-crisis 
sample and a crisis sample. The log value of the yearly median spread was significantly 
larger in the crisis period (–3.194) than in the pre-crisis period (–3.571), which means that 
liquidity decreased in 2008 and 2009 (see also Figure 1). With respect to financial reporting 
quality, we did not find any significant changes in the five accounting quality proxies 
between the crisis period and the pre-crisis period; this indicates that the accounting quality 
during our sample period was stable. We also found, as expected, that share turnover and 
share prices were lower and return volatility was higher during the crisis period than in the 
pre-crisis period. In addition, 46.7% of the sample firms reported negative net income in 
the crisis period, which was significantly higher than during the pre-crisis period (34.2%), 
suggesting that the sample firms suffered from financial and operating difficulties in the 
crisis. We also calculated Pearson correlation coefficients, and the results (not tabulated) 
showed that illiquidity was positively and significantly correlated with Crisis but 
negatively correlated with AQ (financial reporting quality), as expected. However, we did 





Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A Descriptive Statistics for All Firms During 2005–2009 
Variable N Mean Median SD Min P5 P95 Max 
Log(Spread) 4271 –3.393 –3.147 1.577 –7.044 –6.426 –1.153 –0.405 
Log(Spread1) 4271 –3.242 –3.036 1.51 –6.733 –6.17 –1.06 –0.047 
Crisis 4271 0.474 0 0.499 0 0 1 1 
AQ_JM 4271 –0.098 –0.059 0.118 –0.622 –0.349 –0.005 –0.001 
AQ_MJM 4271 –0.099 –0.059 0.118 –0.625 –0.354 –0.005 –0.001 
AQ_AJM 4271 –0.098 –0.059 0.119 –0.639 –0.358 –0.005 –0.001 
AQ_MBCFO 4271 –0.091 –0.055 0.109 –0.599 –0.323 –0.005 –0.001 
AQ_PJM 4271 –0.096 –0.059 0.113 –0.604 –0.342 –0.005 –0.001 
Turnover 4271 –7.084 –7.272 1.26 –9.746 –8.993 –4.919 –4.483 
Size 4271 4.719 4.428 2.152 0.536 1.557 8.646 10.571 
Volatility 4271 –3.679 –3.709 0.521 –4.819 –4.51 –2.779 –2.407 
Loss 4271 0.401 0 0.49 0 0 1 1 
PRICE 4271 4.013 1.5 6.749 0.01 0.04 16.69 42.89 
 
Panel B Descriptive Statistics for Pre-Crisis Period and Crisis Period 
 Crisis=0 (2005–2007) Crisis=1 (2008–2009) 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median 
Log(Spread) –3.571 –3.351 –3.194*** –2.823*** 
Log(Spread1) –3.432 –3.233 –3.032*** –2.711*** 
AQ_JM –0.1 –0.06 –0.096 –0.058 
AQ_MJM –0.1 –0.06 –0.097 –0.058 
AQ_AJM –0.1 –0.06 –0.096 –0.058 
AQ_MBCFO –0.092 –0.057 –0.09 –0.054 
AQ_PJM –0.097 –0.059 –0.094 –0.059 
Turnover –6.945 –7.069 –7.237*** –7.482*** 
Size 4.707 4.397 4.733 4.469 
Volatility –3.814 –3.891 –3.531*** –3.545*** 
Loss 0.342 0 0.467*** 0*** 
PRICE 5.047 2.325 2.867*** 0.91*** 
Observation 2246 2246 2025 2025 
Log(spread) is the log value of the yearly median quoted spread (defined as the difference between the bid and ask price 
divided by the mid–point and measured at the end of each trading day), and log(spread1) is the log value of the yearly mean 
quoted spread. Crisis is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the observation is from 2008 and 2009 and is 0 otherwise. 
AQ_JM, AQ_MJM, AQ_AJM, AQ_MBCFO, and AQ_PJM are five proxies of earnings quality (defined as the product 
of –1 and the absolute value of discretionary accruals; discretionary accruals were estimated using the cross-sectional Jones 
model, the cross-sectional modified Jones model, the cross-sectional adapted Jones model, the cross-sectional modified 
Jones model with book-to-market ratio and cash flow from operations, and the cross-sectional modified Jones model with 
the last-year ROA). Turnover is the log value of last year’s median share turnover, which is defined as daily US$ trading 
volume divided by the market value at the end of each trading day. Size is the log value of last year’s median market value of 
equity, which is defined as stock price times the number of shares outstanding (in US$ million). Volatility is the log value of 
last year’s median share volatility, which is defined as the standard deviation of daily stock returns in a given year. Loss is a 
dummy variable, which equals one if net income is negative in a given year and 0 otherwise. PRICE is the ending trading 
price in a given year. The t-test was used to test mean differences between the non-crisis sample and the crisis sample, and 










d. The Role of Financial Reporting Quality in the Financial Crisis 
Table 3 reports OLS coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics based on robust 
standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-consistent and clustered by firm. We first used 
the discretionary accruals estimated by applying the performance-matched Jones model 
(Kothari et al., 2005) to proxy for financial reporting quality. Column (1) of Table 3 shows 
that the coefficient on Crisis is positively significant (t = 4.80 and P < .01), which suggests 
that the overall effect of the crisis was a drop in market liquidity, as expected. This means 
that, during the financial crisis, firms suffered from bad market conditions. However, we 
conjecture that the degree of market impact was conditional on the characteristics of each 
firm, particularly the quality of financial reporting, which is a key element associated with 
investor confidence. Thus, our primary interest is the interaction between the variables of 
crisis and financial reporting quality proxy (Crisis*AQ_PJM). If higher financial reporting 
quality helps firms, the coefficient of the interaction term will be negative. The coefficient 
was –0.605 and therefore significant (t = –3.61, P < .01), supporting our hypothesis that 
higher-quality financial reporting reduced the negative effect of the financial crisis on share 
liquidity. Note that the coefficient of AQ was insignificant, suggesting that bid-ask is not 
sensitive to accounting quality during ordinary business periods. However, in the context of 
economic meltdown and a crisis of investor confidence, high-quality financial information 
became important as a consequence of the unusually high degree of uncertainty and risk, 
which increased the sensitivity of market price to financial disclosure. The negative 
coefficient of Crisis*AQ_PJM is consistent with this interpretation. Our inferences held 
when we controlled for the known influence from a set of control variables, such as share 
turnover, firm value, return volatility, as well as industry fixed effects on market liquidity. 
Table 4 shows the results of our use of the Jones model, the modified Jones model, the 
adapted Jones model, and the Jones model with book-to-market ratio and cash flows from 
operations to estimate discretionary accruals multiplied by –1; the results were virtually the 





Table 3 The Role of Earnings Quality on Liquidity during the Financial Crisis 
 (1) (2) 
Liquidity  Log(spread) Log(spread1) 
Constant –1.797*** –1.461*** 
 (–12.06) (–9.71) 
AQ_PJM 0.148 0.086 
 (1.14) (0.64) 
Crisis 0.122*** 0.140*** 
 (4.80) (5.25) 
Crisis*AQ_PJM –0.605*** –0.680*** 
 (–3.61) (–3.99) 
Turnover –0.330*** –0.298*** 
 (–23.42) (–21.49) 
Size –0.518*** –0.493*** 
 (–60.28) (–58.38) 
Volatility 0.395*** 0.411*** 
 (14.67) (15.09) 
Industry FE Y Y 
N 4271 4271 
R2 0.867 0.853 
Adj. R2 0.866 0.852 
Log(spread) is log value of the yearly median quoted spread (defined as the difference between the bid and ask price 
divided by the mid-point and measured at the end of each trading day), and Log(spread1) is log value of the yearly mean 
quoted spread. Crisis is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the observation is from 2008 and 2009 and is 0 otherwise. 
AQ_PJM is a proxy of earnings quality (defined as the product of –1 and the absolute value of discretionary accruals; 
discretionary accruals were estimated using the cross-sectional modified Jones model with the last-year ROA). Turnover is 
the log value of last year’s median share turnover, which is defined as daily US$ trading volume divided by the market value 
at the end of each trading day. Size is the log value of last year’s median market value of equity, which is defined as stock 
price times the number of shares outstanding (in US$ million). Volatility is the log value of last year’s median share 
volatility, which is defined as the standard deviation of daily stock returns in a given year. The table reports OLS coefficient 
estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics based on robust standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-consistent and clustered 





Table 4 The Role of Earnings Quality on Liquidity during the Financial Crisis (Different 
EQ Proxies) 

















Constant –1.826*** –1.490*** –1.821*** –1.489*** –1.822*** –1.488*** –1.861*** –1.530*** 
 (–12.20) (–9.86) (–12.20) (–9.87) (–12.17) (–9.83) (–12.36) (–10.08) 
Crisis 0.126*** 0.145*** 0.125*** 0.145*** 0.126*** 0.145*** 0.136*** 0.156*** 
 (4.92) (5.38) (4.88) (5.37) (4.91) (5.36) (5.44) (5.88) 
AQ_JM 0.052 –0.009       
 (0.41) (–0.06)       
Crisis*AQ_JM –0.564*** –0.621***       
 (–3.42) (–3.64)       
AQ_MJM   0.069 –0.004     
   (0.56) (–0.03)     
Crisis*AQ_MJM   –0.569*** –0.621***     
   (–3.48) (–3.68)     
AQ_AJM     0.065 0.001   
     (0.52) (0.01)   
Crisis*AQ_AJM     –0.559*** –0.618***   
     (–3.42) (–3.66)   
AQ_MBCFO       –0.073 –0.149 
       (–0.53) (–1.01) 
Crisis*AQ_MBCF
O 
      –0.505*** –0.569*** 
       (–2.92) (–3.16) 
Turnover –0.331*** –0.298*** –0.331*** –0.298*** –0.331*** –0.298*** –0.331*** –0.299*** 
 (–23.48) (–21.54) (–23.48) (–21.55) (–23.47) (–21.54) (–23.52) (–21.59) 
Size –0.517*** –0.491*** –0.517*** –0.491*** –0.517*** –0.491*** –0.516*** –0.491*** 
 (–60.05) (–58.02) (–60.06) (–58.06) (–59.99) (–57.98) (–60.17) (–58.08) 
Volatility 0.393*** 0.409*** 0.393*** 0.409*** 0.393*** 0.409*** 0.389*** 0.404*** 
 (14.56) (14.98) (14.59) (14.99) (14.58) (14.99) (14.37) (14.80) 
Industry FE F F F F F F F F 
N 4271 4271 4271 4271 4271 4271 4271 4271 
R2 0.867 0.853 0.867 0.853 0.867 0.853 0.867 0.853 
Adj. R2 0.866 0.852 0.866 0.852 0.866 0.852 0.866 0.852 
 Log(spread) is the log value of the yearly median quoted spread (defined as the difference between the bid and ask price 
divided by the mid-point and measured at the end of each trading day), and log(spread1) is the log value of the yearly 
mean quoted spread. Crisis is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the observation is from 2008 and 2009 and is 0 
otherwise. AQ_JM, AQ_MJM, AQ_AJM, and AQ_MBCFO are four proxies of earnings quality (defined as the product 
of –1 and the absolute value of discretionary accruals; discretionary accruals were estimated using the cross-sectional 
Jones model, the cross-sectional modified Jones model, the cross-sectional adapted Jones model, and the cross-sectional 
modified Jones model with book-to-market ratio and cash flow from operations). Turnover is the log value of last year’s 
median share turnover, which is defined as daily US$ trading volume divided by the market value at the end of each 
trading day. Size is the log value of last year’s median market value of equity, which is defined as stock price times the 
number of shares outstanding (in US$ million). Volatility is the log value of last year’s median share volatility, which is 
defined as the standard deviation of daily stock returns in a given year. The table reports OLS coefficient estimates and (in 
parentheses) t-statistics based on robust standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-consistent and clustered by firm. *** 
denotes significance at the 1% level (two-tailed). 
 
Note that while we reached a similar conclusion as did Lang and Maffett (2011), who 
addressed this issue in an international setting, we focused exclusively on financial reporting 
quality, while Lang and Maffett additionally considered auditor quality. In addition, our 
research design enabled us to avoid many international/national institutional effects, such as 
degree of legal protection for outside investors, stringency of disclosure requirements, media 
penetration, ownership concentration, and adoption of different accounting standards (H. 




Because of these differences in research setting, methodology, and sample selection, the 
results are not directly comparable, although our evidence is generally consistent with theirs.  
 
e. Robustness Tests 
We conducted a number of robustness tests. First, we increased the threshold from 10 
observations to 20 observations in each two-digit SIC-year grouping to calculate financial 
reporting quality indicators and rerun our tests; the results (not reported) were qualitatively 
the same. Second, we included an intercept in the discretionary accruals model as an 
additional control for heteroscedasticity (Kothari et al., 2005); the results (not tabulated) 
were virtually unchanged. Third, we reduced the sample size by excluding firms with less 
than US$1 million in total assets (instead of market value of equity), and again, the results 
remained qualitatively the same. In addition, some previous studies did not include the 
variable of leverage (e.g., Muller et al., 2011), which might be a factor associated with 
market risk (Ng, 2011). Therefore, we reran our model with leverage as an additional 
control, and the result (not reported) was qualitatively the same.  
 
Fourth, our sample included both financial and non-financial institutions. Because financial 
firms were hit more severely by the crisis, it is possible that the positive relationship 
between reporting quality and liquidity may not apply to financial firms. This appears to be 
a valid concern and is worthy of further investigation, because these firms lost huge 
amounts of money for their investors; it can be argued, therefore, that it is very unlikely 
that their financial reporting would have maintained investor confidence. Therefore, we ran 
the tests separately on financial and non-financial firms using the same model 
specifications. We found virtually the same results (not tabulated) from the two subsamples, 
suggesting that, although financial sectors are inherently more sensitive to market volatility, 
high-quality financial reporting remained successful in mitigating the negative impact of 
the crisis, even for financial firms. 
 
Fifth, there are some endogeneity concerns about our research design. That is, liquidity and 
financial reporting quality may be determined by some other omitted variables. For 
example, financially distressed firms (e.g., loss-making firms) may have more uncertainty 
about future return, which is inevitably correlated with liquidity. Thus, we added two 
control variables into the regression: whether a firm had negative earnings in one year or 
not (LOSS) and share price at the end of the year (PRICE). PRICE was included to control 
for market makers’ order processing costs, which are proportionately lower for 
higher-priced stocks. A negative coefficient for PRICE was expected (Muller et al., 2011). 
Table 5 reports the results of regressions with these additional control variables, and our 











Table 5 The Role of Earnings Quality on Liquidity during Financial Crisis (Controlled for 
Performance) 
































 (–15.76) (–13.78) (–15.76) (–13.79) (–15.73) (–13.76) (–15.83) (–13.90) (–15.69) (–13.72) 
Crisis 0.090*** 0.108*** 0.091*** 0.109*** 0.091*** 0.108*** 0.099*** 0.116*** 0.089*** 0.104*** 
 (3.56) (4.04) (3.58) (4.08) (3.57) (4.03) (3.94) (4.40) (3.48) (3.92) 
AQ_ _JM 0.181 0.128         





–0.618***         
 (–3.55) (–3.80)         
AQ_MJM   0.190 0.124       





–0.599***       
   (–3.48) (–3.70)       
AQ_AJM     0.191 0.134     
     (1.58) (1.06)     
Crisis*AQ_A
JM 
    –0.551**
* 
–0.609***     
     (–3.49) (–3.76)     
AQ_MBCFO       0.104 0.039   
       (0.79) (0.28)   
Crisis*AQ_M
BCFO 
      –0.525**
* 
–0.589***   
       (–3.16) (–3.45)   
AQ_PJM         0.264** 0.209 
         (2.11) (1.62) 
Crisis*AQ_PJ
M 
        –0.589**
* 
–0.663*** 









-0.302*** -0.334*** -0.301*** 












 (–51.93) (–50.49) (–51.95) (–50.51) (–51.90) (–50.47) (–51.95) (–50.46) (–52.08) (–50.69) 
Volatility 0.306*** 0.317*** 0.307*** 0.317*** 0.307*** 0.317*** 0.304*** 0.315*** 0.308*** 0.319*** 
 (11.34) (11.72) (11.36) (11.73) (11.36) (11.73) (11.24) (11.62) (11.41) (11.80) 
Loss 0.305*** 0.324*** 0.305*** 0.324*** 0.306*** 0.324*** 0.304*** 0.322*** 0.307*** 0.326*** 












 (–3.15) (–3.55) (–3.14) (–3.54) (–3.14) (–3.55) (–3.12) (–3.52) (–3.13) (–3.53) 
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 4271 4271 4271 4271 4271 4271 4271 4271 4271 4271 
R2 0.875 0.863 0.875 0.863 0.875 0.863 0.875 0.863 0.875 0.863 
Adj. R2 0.874 0.862 0.874 0.862 0.874 0.862 0.874 0.862 0.874 0.862 
Log(spread) is the log value of the yearly median quoted spread (defined as the difference between the bid 
and ask price divided by the mid-point and measured at the end of each trading day), and log(spread1) is the 
log value of the yearly mean quoted spread. Crisis is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the observation is 
from 2008 and 2009 and is 0 otherwise. AQ_JM, AQ_MJM, AQ_AJM, AQ_MBCFO, and AQ_PJM are 
five proxies of earnings quality (defined as the product of –1 and the absolute value of discretionary accruals; 
discretionary accruals were estimated using the cross-sectional Jones model, the cross-sectional modified 
Jones model, the cross-sectional adapted Jones model, the cross-sectional modified Jones model with 
book-to-market ratio and cash flow from operations, and the cross-sectional modified Jones model with the 
last-year ROA). Turnover is the log value of last year’s median share turnover, which is defined as daily 
US$ trading volume divided by the market value at the end of each trading day. Size is the log value of last 
year’s median market value of equity, which is defined as stock price times the number of shares outstanding 
(in US$ million). Volatility is the log value of last year’s median share volatility, which is defined as the 




income is negative in a given year and 0 otherwise. PRICE is the ending trading price in a given year. The 
table reports OLS coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics based on robust standard errors that 
are heteroscedasticity-consistent and clustered by firm. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
 
Finally, we have emphasized here that financial reporting quality may increase or decrease 
liquidity. However, it can be argued that firms that suffer from a decrease in liquidity may 
have a greater incentive to manipulate earnings. In this case, it is the illiquidity that affects 
the quality of financial reporting, rather than the other way around. Thus, our results may 
be driven by this factor. To address this reverse causality, we averaged the discretionary 
accruals of years t-2, t-1, and t and multiplied this number by –1 to serve as a proxy for 
financial reporting quality. Table 6 reports the results of regressions using the average past 
earnings quality proxy, and, once more, our inferences remained intact. 
 
Table 6 The Role of Earnings Quality in Liquidity during the Financial Crisis (Average 
Discretionary Accruals as EQ) 
































 (–11.27) (–9.40) (–11.21) (–9.37) (–11.24) (–9.37) (–11.28) (–9.45) (–11.39) (–9.55) 
Crisis 0.074** 0.073** 0.069* 0.068* 0.073** 0.072* 0.072** 0.071* 0.088** 0.085** 
 (2.10) (1.98) (1.94) (1.83) (2.07) (1.94) (1.97) (1.84) (2.46) (2.28) 
AQ_JM –0.472* –0.515*         





–0.995***         
 (–3.09) (–3.30)         
AQ_MJM   –0.442* –0.494*       





–1.036***       
   (–3.19) (–3.39)       
AQ_AJM     –0.460* –0.497*     
     (–1.76) (–1.86)     
Crisis*AQ_AJ
M 
    –0.902**
* 
–1.001***     
     (–3.09) (–3.32)     
AQ_MBCFO       –0.552* –0.611**   
       (–1.90) (–2.03)   
Crisis*AQ_M
BCFO 
      –0.989**
* 
–1.099***   
       (–2.95) (–3.16)   
AQ_PJM         –0.581** –0.630** 
         (–2.06) (–2.20) 
Crisis*AQ_PJ
M 
        –0.779** –0.893*** 
























 (–51.22) (–49.81) (–50.99) (–49.64) (–51.02) (–49.67) (–51.48) (–50.05) (–51.30) (–49.86) 
Volatility 0.377*** 0.399*** 0.378*** 0.400*** 0.377*** 0.400*** 0.374*** 0.396*** 0.376*** 0.398*** 
 (11.71) (12.24) (11.73) (12.25) (11.72) (12.25) (11.51) (12.06) (11.72) (12.27) 
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 3398 3398 3398 3398 3398 3398 3398 3398 3398 3398 
R2 0.877 0.865 0.877 0.865 0.877 0.865 0.877 0.865 0.877 0.865 





Log(spread) is the log value of the yearly median quoted spread (defined as the difference between the bid and ask price 
divided by the mid-point and measured at the end of each trading day), and log(spread1) is the log value of the yearly 
mean quoted spread. Crisis is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the observation is from 2008 and 2009 and is 0 
otherwise. AQ_JM, AQ_MJM, AQ_AJM, AQ_MBCFO, and AQ_PJM are five proxies of earnings quality (defined as 
the average value of year t-2, t-1, and t’s AQ. AQ is the product of –1 and the absolute value of discretionary accruals; 
discretionary accruals were estimated using the cross-sectional Jones model, the cross-sectional modified Jones model, 
the cross-sectional adapted Jones model, the cross-sectional modified Jones model with book-to-market ratio and cash 
flow from operations, and the cross-sectional modified Jones model with the last-year ROA). Turnover is the log value of 
last year’s median share turnover, which is defined as daily US$ trading volume divided by the market value at the end of 
each trading day. Size is the log value of last year’s median market value of equity, which is defined as stock price times 
the number of shares outstanding (in US$ million). Volatility is the log value of last year’s median share volatility, which 
is defined as the standard deviation of daily stock returns in a given year. The table reports OLS coefficient estimates and 
(in parentheses) t-statistics based on robust standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-consistent and clustered by firm. *, 
**, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
This paper examined the impact of financial reporting quality on the liquidity of the equity 
market during the recent financial crisis (and by extension, any financial crisis). Many studies 
have attempted to explore the possible reasons for the illiquidity of the financial market 
(Copeland & Galai, 1983; Glosten & Milgrom, 1985; Stoll, 1989; Callahan et al., 1997; Laux 
et al., 2010), and some have claimed that accounting plays a negative role but provided 
inadequate evidence for this assertion (Barth et al., 2010; Laux et al., 2010). Moreover, 
previous research typically focused on particular items (such as financial items measured by 
fair value) and financial institutions. However, such a narrowly focused approach might not 
provide a complete picture of the role played by accounting in financial meltdowns. 
 
In contrast, we adopted a broader perspective to guide our research design. Our sample 
included not only financial firms but also non-financial firms. We examined the quality of the 
financial reporting system as a whole (rather than just fair-value accounting). Based on 
previous findings regarding information asymmetry and investor confidence (Liao et al., 
2010), we conjectured that, during the recent financial crisis, uncertainty and information risk 
were much greater than before the crisis, and if financial reporting was known to be reliable, 
it would have helped mitigate information uncertainty and helped restore investor confidence. 
This would mean that accounting may play a more observable role in liquidity, and we would 
find evidence that firms that provided high-quality financial information were less adversely 
affected by the crisis. Our findings supported this prediction, and the effect was manifested in 
financial firms with even lower investor confidence. Our results were robust after controlling 
for possible confounding factors and have the potential to help resolve the controversy 
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